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Abstract
The psychological correlates of utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas are contentious. In the literature, some
research (Greene, et al., 2001) suggested that utilitarianism requires analytic thinking while other research (Kahane et al.,
2015) showed that utilitarianism is correlated with psychopathy. In the present research, we looked at the relation of several
normative views with analytic cognitive style (ACS), psychopathy and real-world utilitarianism in three Turkish samples. In
Study 1 (n = 269), we used four ethical dilemmas and asked participants to select one normative principle as the grounds for
their judgment in the dilemma: fatalism, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology and amoralism. The results showed that the
majority selected the deontological principle. Additionally, there was a considerable amount of fatalistic and virtue ethical
justifications. Utilitarianism and psychopathy had a significant positive correlation. In Study 2 (n = 246), we replicated Study
1 and showed a significant relation between ACS and moral minimalism (the view that the sacrificial act is permissible but
not necessary). In Study 3, the results showed that the utilitarian option in the sacrificial dilemmas was positively correlated
with both real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy, but the latter two variables were not correlated with each other. All in all,
the results suggest that some people choose the utilitarian option in moral dilemmas from psychopathic tendencies (as Kahane
argued), while others due to real-life utilitarian reasons (as Greene argued). The findings also indicate that virtue ethical and
fatalistic justifications cannot be ignored in understanding lay people’s moral judgments.
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1 Introduction
Utilitarianism in normative ethics is focused on whether the
consequences of an action maximize well-being (Mill, 1861).
Thus, for example, in order to save five persons, one person
can and should be sacrificed. Deontology, on the other
hand, is often focused on whether the action accords with
universal rights and duties (Kant, 1785). This implies that
the consequences of the action are often immaterial. For
example, an innocent person should never be sacrificed even
if the sacrifice would lead to the survival of a much greater
number of persons.
Given these sometimes counterintuitive implications, the
structure and predictors of normative ethical positions, in-
cluding utilitarianism and deontology, have been intensely
studied in the last 15 years. One of the most popular frame-
works of the psychology of moral judgment is the dual-
process approach (see Greene et al., 2001). In this per-
spective, deontological and utilitarian judgments can be ex-
plained on the basis of the operation of two separate mental
processes. Type 1 processes are evolutionarily older, intu-
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itive and automatic. Cycling for someone who is an expe-
rienced bike rider or recognizing an angry face in a crowd
typically engages Type 1 processing. Type 2 processes, on
the other hand, are evolutionarily more recent, analytic, con-
trolled and reflective. Type 1 processing can be thought
of as default, whereas the computationally more demanding
Type 2 processes sometimes override the more automatic
processes. Solving a novel type of problem or spotting a
person in the crowd with a specific set of features engages
Type 2 processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2003; Frederick,
2005; Kahneman, 2011; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010;
Stanovich & West, 2000).
In Greene et al.’s (2004) two-process model of moral judg-
ment, utilitarian judgments stem from brain regions involved
in analytic thinking whereas deontological judgments stem
from brain regions related to emotional processing. The
fact that making a utilitarian judgment typically takes longer
than a deontological judgment has been offered as support-
ing this view.1 Greene et al. (2004) also found that utilitarian
responding in moral dilemmas is associated with activation
in the high-effort thinking areas of the brain including the
DLPFC and the anterior cingulate cortex (see also Cush-
man, Murray, Gordon-McKeon, Wharton & Greene, 2012,
for similar findings). In addition, people primed to think ana-
1However, it is also possible that utilitarian judgments take longer when
they are untypical or rare (Gürçay & Baron, 2017; see also Baron, Scott,
Fincher & Metz, 2015).
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lytically are more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments
(Kvaran, Nichols & Sanfey, 2013).2 One other support for
the dual-process model is provided by mortality salience ma-
nipulations. Studies suggest that reminding people of their
own mortality suppresses analytic thinking by creating a high
cognitive load (Trémolière, De Neys & Bonnefon, 2014).
Mortality salience also leads to a suppression of utilitarian
judgments (Trémolière, De Neys & Bonnefon, 2012). This
finding seems to support Greene et al.’s (2001) dual-process
account whereby mortality salience leads to a decrease in
utilitarian judgments by suppressing analytic thinking (see
also Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008;
Paxton, Bruni & Greene, 2014; but see Baron & Gürçay,
2016; Gürçay & Baron, 2017; Tinghög et al., 2016, for crit-
icisms of the dual-process account).
Despite these findings, Kahane (2012) argues that choos-
ing the utilitarian option in sacrificial dilemmas does not nec-
essarily reflect an underlying utilitarian outlook. The main
reason is that the utilitarian option involves actively harming
someone and the tendency toward harm can be caused by a
wide variety of motives. To find out the underlying cause of
choosing the utilitarian option, Kahane et al. (2015) inves-
tigated the relation between responses in sacrificial dilem-
mas and utilitarianism in the traditional sense. They found
that utilitarian choices were positively correlated with eth-
ical transgressions in a business context, with sub-clinical
psychopathy, and with rational egoism, and negatively cor-
related with giving to charity and with identification with
humanity. Such choices were not related to real-world utili-
tarianism, self-sacrifice or impartiality. These findings seem
to support Kahane’s (2012) view that utilitarian responses in
sacrificial dilemmas are more indicative of psychopathy than
of real-world utilitarianism. Insofar as we can infer anything
from fMRI studies (see Uttal, 2011 for a critique), Wiech
et al. (2013) demonstrated, consistent with Kahane’s (2012)
view, that a brain area related to empathic concern (subgen-
ual cingulate cortex), and not high-effort thinking areas, be-
comes active during utilitarian responses. Similarly, Koenigs
et al. (2007) showed that damage to the prefrontal cortex, pre-
sumably an analytic thinking area, increases rather decreases
utilitarian responding (but see Greene et al., 2004, for find-
ings that link abstract reasoning regions in the brain and
utilitarian responding). Finally, Djeriouat and Trémolière
(2014) found that psychopathy as a personality trait is pos-
itively correlated with utilitarian responses and decreased
harm sensitivity mediates this relationship (see also Bartels
& Pizarro, 2011, and Patil, 2015, for other findings linking
psychopathy and utilitarianism).
2It should be noted, however, that the analytic thinking manipulation
in this study involved mathematical operations which might have led the
participants to automatically make “five is greater than one” judgments,
rather than leading them to really think analytically. For this reason, a
replication of this study with a non-mathematical priming method is in
order (see Kahane, 2012). See also Gürçay and Baron (2017) who failed to
find this effect.
Royzman, Landy and Leeman (2015) extended previous
research by having participants make moral judgments based
on how permissible and how required an act is rather than
just how right or wrong it is (see also Banerjee, Huebner &
Hauser, 2010 for a similar question format). In the footbridge
dilemma, for instance, a participant who judged killing one
person to save five as both permissible and required was clas-
sified as a utilitarian whereas someone who judged killing
one as permissible but not required was classified as a moral
minimalist. Two studies by Royzman et al. (2015) showed
that scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005)
were correlated with minimalism but not with utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism was instead correlated with psychopathy, in
parallel with Kahane et al. (2015). This again suggests that
the so-called utilitarian option in sacrificial dilemmas is a
poor measure of individual differences in traditional utilitar-
ianism.
One limitation of the foregoing studies is that they were
all conducted in Western Christian cultures with college stu-
dents or mTurk participants. For this reason, it is imper-
ative to test the generality of the findings on non-Western
and non-Christian samples (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan,
2010). Another limitation is that, although previous studies
focus on the opposition between utilitarianism and deontol-
ogy, other normative ethical views exist and might shape
people’s moral judgments. Consistent with this, Uhlmann,
Pizarro and Diermeier (2015) claim that moral judgments
are influenced by the character of the actors in the dilem-
mas as well as their actions. In other words, participants
make separate judgments about whether the actor is a good
or a bad person and whether the action in question is right
or wrong. Accordingly, Uhlmann et al. (2015) claim that
people act like intuitive virtue theorists when making moral
judgments. This makes sense from an adaptive point of view
because what we need to evaluate in an everyday context is
whether a person we encounter is trustable or would make a
good friend, and the person’s general moral character, rather
than individual actions, is more predictive in this regard.
For example, a person who smothers a baby to save a group
of fellow citizens might be judged to perform the right ac-
tion from a utilitarian point of view but still be undesired
as a friend because of a presumed defect in his character
(Uhlmann et al., 2015).3
In the present set of studies, in addition to eliciting moral
judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (e.g., the trolley dilem-
mas, see Greene et al., 2001), we asked the justification of
right/wrong judgments regarding the actions in the dilem-
mas. In addition to the utilitarian and deontological reasons,
we added another question that purported to measure virtue
ethical reasons as described above. We also surmised that
3Note that, in the present context, we have a restricted definition of
utilitarianism where only maximization of immediate well-being, and not
character traits, development of virtues etc., are seen as the relevant conse-
quences of an action.
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people might have other reasons to make right/wrong judg-
ments. One possibility in a predominantly Muslim society is
not to interfere with what fate has already in store for a per-
son. Deaths on a massive scale as in earthquakes, accidents,
wars, etc., are routinely attributed to fate and are deemed
to be unavoidable (Cesur, 2003). This principle might lead
some participants to refrain from intervening in the course
of events to kill one to save five, just as a typical deonto-
logical or virtue ethical principle might. The reason would
be to avoid taking responsibility for the death of one person.
The death of the five persons, on the other hand, is arguably
determined by divine authority and is not under the purview
of the participant. For this reason, we added a fourth item
that purported to measure fatalism as the justification of the
right-wrong judgments. Finally, we added a fifth item to test
the possibility that ethical principles might not have played a
significant role in the participants’ judgments (amoralism).
The research reported here has thus two main aims: to
determine the reason/justification behind the judgments in
sacrificial dilemmas and to investigate how different moral
judgments relate to analytic thinking and psychopathy. A
subsidiary aim was to test the arguments by Greene and
Kahane in a non-Western sample. In Study 1, we sought
to delineate the reasons participants gave for their utilitar-
ian or deontological responses in sacrificial dilemmas in
a forced-choice format by presenting them with five op-
tions. We also investigated the utilitarianism-psychopathy
and minimalism-analytic thinking associations in a predom-
inantly Muslim sample. We replicated these associations
in Study 2. In Study 3, we had the participants rate the
importance of each reason on a continuous scale and inves-
tigated their relation with utilitarianism-minimalism scores,
analytic thinking, psychopathy, and real-life utilitarianism.
2 Study 1
While Greene et al. (2001) claim that utilitarian judgments
in sacrificial dilemmas are really utilitarian and related to
analytic thinking, Kahane et al. (2015) claim they are not re-
lated to real-life utilitarianism and are related to psychopathy
instead. Royzman et al. (2015), on the other hand, demon-
strated that analytic thinking is associated not with utilitari-
anism but with moral minimalism. Minimalism in this con-
text is defined as judging the one-person sacrifice as permis-
sible but not obligatory. In Study 1, we treated permissible
and obligatory judgments as continuous and measured them
as such instead of treating them as categorical and forced
choice options as in Royzman et al.’s (2015) original study.
In addition, we explored other normative moral principles
(e.g., virtue ethics) as possible motivators of moral judg-
ments in sacrificial dilemmas. Finally, in contrast to most
studies in the moral psychology literature, we used a pre-
dominantly Muslim sample in the study. We presented the
personal and impersonal versions of the Transplant dilem-
mas and the Footbridge-Trolley dilemmas and asked about
the justifications for judging the sacrifice as morally right or
wrong. We also used a continuous measure of utilitarian-




A total of 269 undergraduates from Doğuş University
(Turkey) took part in the study for extra course credit (mean
age = 21.57, SD = 4.21; 204 women, 63 men, two unre-
ported). The majority of the participants identified them-
selves as Muslim (n = 209). Of the remaining, 20 were athe-
ists, 24 reported believing in God with no affiliation with an
established religion, four were affiliated with a religion other
than Islam and one did not respond.
2.1.2 Materials
Moral Vignettes. Four different dilemmas were used to ex-
amine the participants’ moral judgments (in the Appendix).
Two of them were “personal,” involving direct harm to the
person involved in the scenario (Organ Transplant personal
and Footbridge) and two were “impersonal,” involving only
indirect harm (Organ Transplant impersonal and Trolley; see
Moore, Clark & Kane, 2008; Moore, Lee, Clark & Conway,
2011).
In the Trolley scenario, a train is out of control and will
kill five persons unless a button is pressed, in which case
the train will change tracks and will kill one other person
instead of five. The participant is asked to judge whether it
is morally right to press the button and cause one person to
die in order to save five.
The Footbridge dilemma is the personal version of the
Trolley dilemma. It involves pushing one person in the
tracks to his death in order to stop the train and save the five
persons.
The personal Organ Transplant scenario involves a sur-
geon who can save five patients only by killing one critically
injured patient by severing his jugular and transplanting his
various organs to the five patients. In the impersonal version
of the Organ Transplant scenario, the surgeon allows the one
patient to die by not stopping a nurse who is about to perform
an erroneous operation and accidentally lead to the death of
the patient. The participants were asked in all scenarios to
judge whether it is morally right to kill one patient in order
to save five.
More specifically, the first question asked the participants
to make a categorical right-wrong judgment. The second
and the third questions asked about how required and how
permissible the sacrificial action was. Unlike in Royzman
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 12, No. 3, May 2017 Justifying moral dilemma responses 300
et al. (2015), we asked these two questions on a Likert scale
from 1 to 7, higher scores indicating higher requiredness
and higher permissibility. Utilitarianism was defined as the
sum of the requiredness and permissibility scores whereas
moral minimalism was defined as the difference between the
permissibility and requiredness scores. Thus, minimalism in
this context meant seeing the sacrificial action as permissible
but not required. A general utilitarianism and minimalism
score was computed by summing over all four scenarios.
Finally, to understand the grounds for making the judg-
ments they did, we presented the participants five items
which corresponded to five different moral justifications.
The first one corresponded to acting on non-moral grounds:
“Moral reasons did not play an important role in my judg-
ment.” The second item expressed a virtue-ethical principle:
“Someone who intentionally harms an innocent person can-
not be moral.” The third item expressed deontology: “Inten-
tionally harming an innocent person is against fundamental
moral rules and is thus unacceptable regardless of its in-
tended consequence.” The fourth item expressed classical
utilitarianism: “Moral action is what ensures the well-being
of maximum number of people.” The fifth item expressed an
acceptance of fate and avoiding responsibility: “It is wrong
to interfere with consequences that arise as a result of the
natural course of events no matter what the ensuing harm
is.” The participants were asked to choose one of the five
justifications for their choices in each of the four dilemmas
presented. The order of the five items was randomized across
participants.
Cognitive Reflection Test. To measure the thinking dis-
positions of the participants, we used the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which is used frequently in
the literature. The test consists of three questions that assess
analytic or intuitive thinking styles, which correspond to a
high-effort or low-effort thinking disposition. Each question
has one true and one intuitive false answer. For example, the
question “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” im-
mediately brings to mind a false intuitive answer (10 cents),
whereas the correct answer (5 cents) requires analytic think-
ing. Correct answers to each of the three questions were
added up and a total CRT score was computed (α = .540).
Mean CRT-correct score for this study is 1.30 (SD = 1.00).
Psychopathy. To assess the psychopathy level of the par-
ticipants, the Turkish translation of the psychopathy subscale
of the Dark Triad scale was used (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
The subscale is a 1–5 Likert-type scale and consists of nine
items (α = .731). One sample item is “Payback needs to be
quick and nasty.”
Demographic form. A demographic form was given at
the end where gender (0 =female, 1 = male), age, religiosity
(1 = not at all religious, 7 = highly religious), etc. were
asked.











Deontological 2 0 10 1 11
Utilitarian 3 4 43 12 62
Fatalistic 2 3 12 0 24
Virtue Ethical 1 0 3 1 6
Amoral 6 8 37 17 69
Total 14 15 105 31 172
Wrong Judgment
Deontological 131 134 61 100 421
Utilitarian 8 8 10 6 28
Fatalistic 41 40 42 54 196
Virtue Ethical 46 48 28 48 182
Amoral 22 20 12 23 75
Total 248 250 153 231 902
2.1.3 Procedure
Materials were distributed in a classroom setting and took
20–30 minutes to complete using paper and pencil. To min-
imize order effects, the order of the scales was counterbal-
anced.
2.2 Results and discussion
Right-wrong judgments. The majority of the participants
judged killing behavior to be morally wrong in all four
dilemmas: 94% in the Personal Transplant dilemma, 93%
in the Impersonal Transplant dilemma, 58% in the Trolley
dilemma, and 87% in the Footbridge dilemma. Table 1 shows
the cross-tabulations between justifications and approval and
disapproval judgments.
As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of the partici-
pants who judged the sacrifice of one person to be wrong
chose the deontological principle as their justification in all
four dilemmas. Although there is more variation among
those who judge the sacrifice to be right, the two most com-
mon justifications were the utilitarian principle (n = 62) and
amorality (n = 69). Somewhat surprising is the small minor-
ity which chooses utilitarianism or amoral reasons as their
justification for judging that killing one person is morally
wrong. That the majority points to deontological reasons
for rejecting killing is consistent with Holyoak and Powell’s
(2016) account that commonsense moral reasoning mostly
seeks deontological coherence. In addition, fatalism and
virtue ethics, rarely discussed in the psychological litera-
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Table 2. Correlations among variables, Study 1. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .061.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1-Utilitarianism 1 .036 −.067 .151∗∗ .130∗∗ .014 −.087
2-Minimalism 1 .135∗ −.006 .108 −.011 −.153∗∗
3-CRT 1 .012 .062 .040 −.153∗∗
4-Psychopathy 1 .277∗∗∗ −.120∗ −.076
5-Gender) 1 .016 −.182∗∗∗
6-Age 1 −.015
7-Religiosity 1
Table 3. Correlations of personal and impersonal moral dilemmas with CRT and psychopathy, Study 1. ***p < .01; **p < .05;
*p < .075.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
1-Uti-Personal 1 .529∗∗∗ .126∗∗ .010 −.073 .126∗∗
2-Uti-Impersonal 1 .075 −.082 −.057 .114∗
3-Min-Personal 1 .492∗∗∗ .117 .062
4-Min-Impersonal 1 .127∗ −.060
5-CRT 1 .012
6-Psychopathy 1
ture, are also seen by a sizeable part of the sample as the
grounds for rejecting killing. This provides some support to
Uhlmann et al.’s (2015) claim that laypeople act like naïve
virtue theorists. The fact that those who condoned killing
did so mostly on non-moral grounds is at odds with Greene’s
dual-process account and Greene et al.’s (2001) findings. In
fact, utilitarianism was less frequently chosen in the present
study than amorality for judging that killing one person is
morally right. This might be interpreted as supporting Ka-
hane’s (2012) claim that the so-called utilitarian option in
sacrificial dilemmas is not always the same as real-world
utilitarianism, at least for some people.
Predictors of utilitarianism and minimalism. Table 2
shows the correlations among variables. Table 3 also shows
the correlations of individual scenarios (Personal vs. Imper-
sonal). Previous research (Royzman et al., 2015) indicates
that CRT predicts moral minimalism but not utilitarianism, in
direct contrast to the dual-process account by Greene (2007).
Unlike Royzman et al. (2015), who treated minimalism and
utilitarianism as categorical variables, we measured them as
continuous variables to see their relation with CRT. Results
indicated an almost significant positive correlation between
CRT scores and moral minimalism, r = .135, p = .061.
Kahane et al. (2015) report that utilitarianism scores in
sacrificial dilemmas are positively correlated with psychopa-
thy and rational egoism scores and negatively correlated with
donating to charity and humanism. In addition, Royzman et
al. (2015) suggest that the negative correlation between be-
having in a utility optimizing manner and empathic concern
indicates that utilitarianism is related to psychopathy rather
than analytic thinking. In parallel with this account, the
present study also found a positive correlation between utili-
tarian responses and psychopathy, r = .151, p = .019. In other
words, the results replicate the previously found associa-
tion of CRT scores with moral minimalism and psychopathy
scores with utilitarianism with a continuous measurement
scale. In Study 2, we sought to replicate the findings on a
sample with a more diverse age range since the association




A total of 246 participants took part in Study 2 (mean age
= 27.31, SD = 9.41; 170 women, 69 men, seven missing).
One research assistant randomly contacted the participants
on the streets of Istanbul. The majority of the participants
identified themselves as Muslims (n = 180). Of the remain-
ing participants, 18 reported themselves to be atheists, 13
as being affiliated with a religion other than Islam, 32 as
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believing in God without being affiliated with a religion and
three did not respond.
3.1.2 Materials and Procedure
Two dilemmas (Trolley and Impersonal Transplant scenar-
ios) were used instead of four. In addition, no justification
was asked of the participants regarding their right/wrong
judgments. The rest of the procedure was the same as in
Study 1. Mean CRT-correct score for this study is 1.36 (SD
= 1.07). The reliabilities of the Psychopathy scale and the
CRT were .70 and .63, respectively.
3.2 Results and Discussion
Table 4 shows the correlations among variables. While util-
itarianism was significantly correlated with psychopathy (r
= .185, p = .005), moral minimalism was significantly corre-
lated with CRT (r = .233, p = .001) in this study. However,
neither utilitarianism is related to CRT, nor moral minimal-
ism to psychopathy. This replicates Royzman et al.’s (2015)
findings with a continuous measure and supports Kahane’s
account.
In addition, the previous study’s results implicate moral
views other than utilitarianism and deontology that guide
individuals’ moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. Al-
though the majority of the participants chose deontology as
their guiding principle, virtue ethics and fatalism were also
chosen as the guiding principle for a sizeable portion of the
sample for the wrong judgments. For the right judgments,
the majority of the participants chose amorality as their guid-
ing principle rather than utilitarianism.
4 Study 3
In Study 1, the guiding principle was measured categorically:
the participants were forced to choose one principle among
five. In Study 3, taking into account the possibility that more
than one principle may be guiding the participants’ choices
at the same time, we asked them to rate the importance
of each principle on a scale from 1 to 5. Study 3 also
included several questions measuring real life utilitarianism
in addition to psychopathy and CRT and their relation to the
guiding principles was examined.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
A total of 389 undergraduates from Doğuş University (mean
age = 22.33, SD = 3.13; 244 women, 138 men, seven miss-
ing) took part in Study 3 for extra course credit. The majority
identified themselves as Muslim (n = 286). Of the remain-
ing participants, 32 were atheists, 59 believed in God but
were not affiliated with a religion, nine were affiliated with
a religion other than Islam and three did not respond.
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure
All materials and procedure were the same as in Study
1 except the following: As in Study 2, two impersonal
moral dilemmas (Trolley and Impersonal Transplant scenar-
ios) were given instead of four. Right/wrong and permissi-
ble/required judgments were asked as in Study 1. After each
of the two dilemmas, participants were asked to rate five
moral principles from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (com-
pletely agree) as to how important each principle was in
their choice. Consequently, a score for each of the five prin-
ciples (non-moral, virtue ethics, fatalism, utilitarianism and
deontology) was formed by taking the sum of the ratings in
the two dilemmas (see Table 5 for mean scores obtained for
the five principles).
In addition to CRT (α = .726) and the psychopathy scale
(α = .690) used in the previous two studies, two items were
asked to measure real life utilitarianism (see Kahane et al.,
2015): “It is morally required for well-off people to give to
charity for the benefit of children in poor countries” and “It is
morally required to give up luxuries in our personal lives in
order to slow down global warming and to leave a habitable
planet to future generations” (α = .640). Mean CRT-correct
score for this study is 0.80 (SD = 1.04).
4.2 Results and Discussion
Table 5 shows the mean justifications, and Table 6 shows
the correlations among variables. The utilitarian option in
the sacrificial dilemmas was positively correlated with real-
life utilitarianism (r = .176, p = .001) and with psychopathy
(r = .186, p < .001). In addition, the utilitarian option in
the dilemmas was positively correlated with the rating of the
utilitarian principle as the justification of the choice (r = .308,
p < .001). In other words, thinking that sacrificing one person
to save five is both permissible and required is correlated
with agreeing with the statement “moral behavior is that
which promotes the well-being of the maximum number
of people.” The utilitarian choice, on the other hand, was
negatively correlated with virtue ethics (r = –.271, p < .001),
deontology (r = –.311, p < .001) and fatalism (r = –.270,
p < .001). No correlation was found between CRT and the
utilitarian choice (r = –.084, p = .120). This replicates the
findings of both Study 2 and Royzman et al. (2015). It is also
consistent with Baron et al.’s (2015) account which argues
that the inconsistent findings regarding the relation between
CRT and utilitarian choices stem from the fact that CRT is
imperfectly correlated with actively open-minded thinking,
which is the real predictor of utilitarian choices.
Moral minimalism, thinking that sacrificing one person
to save five is permissible but not required, was negatively
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Table 4. Correlations among variables, Study 2. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .061.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1-Utilitarianism 1 −.085 .004 .185∗∗∗ .100 −.021 .112
2-Minimalism 1 .233∗∗ .062 .101 −.086 −.129∗
3-CRT 1 .047 .170∗ .025 −.169∗
4-Psychopathy 1 .258∗∗∗ −.144∗ −.072
5-Gender 1 .022 .013
6-Age 1 −.013
7-Religiosity 1
Table 5. The mean justification ratings for two dilemmas,
Study 3. SDs in parenthesis.
Justifications Organ Trolley Total
Deontological 3.88 (1.21) 3.67 (1.31) 3.77 (1.17)
Utilitarian 2.86 (1.41) 3.02 (1.38) 2.94 (1.31)
Fatalistic 3.39 (1.27) 3.24 (1.27) 3.31 (1.16)
Virtue Ethical 4.05 (1.26) 3.98 (1.28) 4.01 (1.17)
Amoral 2.88 (1.29) 2.92 (1.29) 2.89 (1.17)
correlated with our measure of real-life utilitarianism (r =
–.146, p = .003). CRT, on the other hand, was not correlated
with moral minimalism (r = .068, p = .210). Furthermore,
moral minimalism was negatively correlated with deontol-
ogy (r = –.203, p < .001) and fatalism (r = –.230, p < .001) as
moral principles, marginally so with virtue ethics (r = –.088,
p = .088), and not correlated with the utilitarianism principle
(r = –.078, p = .129).
Table 7 also shows the correlations among the main vari-
ables (CRT, psychopathy and real-life utilitarianism) and
justifications scores. The results showed that CRT is neg-
atively correlated with utilitarian justification (r = –.112, p
= .038), but not significantly correlated with any other jus-
tification. Psychopathy was negatively correlated with both
virtue ethics (r = –.143, p = .006) and deontology (r = –.124,
p = .016), but not significantly correlated with utilitarianism
justification (r = .091, p = .078). Real life utilitarianism
was positively correlated with all of the justifications except
amorality (see Table 7).
The finding that the utilitarian choice is associated with
both real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy might indicate
that some participants choose the utilitarian option for one
reason and some for the other. The finding that real life
utilitarianism is not related to psychopathy, whereas utilitar-
ian choice in the sacrificial moral dilemmas is significantly
related to psychopathy, supports this view (see Table 6)
Our findings indicate, in contrast to Greene et al.’s (2001)
account, that while utilitarian choices are associated with
psychopathy, it is moral minimalism that is associated with
analytic thinking. On the other hand, the positive correla-
tion between utilitarian choices and real-life utilitarianism is
consistent with Greene et al. (2001). The results suggest that
different, in fact diametrically opposed (i.e., caring for hu-
manity vs. psychopathy), motives might underlie utilitarian
responses in sacrificial dilemmas.
5 General Discussion
The principal aim of the study was to determine the moral
principles that guided individuals’ choice of the utilitarian
and moral minimalist options in sacrificial moral dilemmas.
The findings supported Kahane’s (2012) account in that the
participants who chose the so-called utilitarian option (sac-
rificing one person to save five) were not mainly guided by
real-life utilitarianism defined as the immediate maximiza-
tion of well-being. In addition, other moral principles which
are generally neglected in the literature, like fatalism and
virtue ethics (and also non-moral reasons), were chosen as
guiding a significant number of participants’ choices.
All three studies indicate that when the sacrifice was rated
separately as permissible and as required, psychopathy was
positively correlated with utilitarianism (“permissible and
required” judgments), but the findings are mixed on the re-
lation between CRT scores and moral minimalism (“permis-
sible but not required”). One of the three samples showed
a significant, one almost significant, and one non-significant
relation between CRT scores and moral minimalism. This
finding provides additional empirical support to Kahane’s
arguments and partial support to Royzman et al.’s (2015)
from a non-western and predominantly Muslim sample.
Study 3 findings indicate that the utilitarian principle used
to justify moral choices was correlated with the choice of
the utilitarian option. This lends some support to the idea
that the utilitarian option in the dilemmas is chosen, at least
in part, because of utilitarian motives. Additionally, real-
life utilitarianism is also correlated with utilitarian choices,
but not with psychopathy. Interestingly, however, utilitar-
ian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas are also correlated
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Table 6. Correlations among variables, Study 3. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .061.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1-Utilitarianism 1 −.076 −.052 .235∗∗∗ −.072 .042 .111∗ .172∗∗∗
2-Minimalism 1 .068 −.111∗ .036 −.100∗ −.222∗∗∗ −.146∗∗∗
3-CRT 1 .142∗∗ −.082 −.144∗∗ −.080 −.040
4-Psychopathy 1 −.030 −.033 .019 −.044
5-Gender 1 −.076 −.018 .012
6-Age 1 .039 −.061
7-Religiosity 1 .282∗∗∗
8-Reallifeuti. 1
Table 7. Additional correlations among variables (not shown in Table 6), Study 3. ***p < .01; **p < .05.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1-CRT 1 .142∗∗∗ −.040 .036 −.006 −.112∗∗ −.042 −.054
2-Psychopathy 1 −.044 −.143∗∗∗ −.124∗∗ .091 −.053 .052
3-Reallifeuti. 1 .105∗∗ .125∗∗ .195∗∗∗ .133∗∗ .089
4-Virtue 1 .713∗∗∗ .066 .398∗∗∗ −.023
5-Deontology 1 .119∗∗ .466∗∗∗ −.053
6-Utilitarianism 1 .090 .023
7-Fatalism 1 −.036
8-Amorality 1
with psychopathy in all three studies. This seems to sug-
gest that some people make utilitarian choices in sacrificial
dilemmas out of utilitarian concerns, as per Greene et al.’s
(2001) account, and other people make utilitarian accounts
out of a psychopathic lack of care for the plight of the one
sacrificed person, as per Kahane’s account. Study 1 also
revealed that the two most common justifications in judging
that killing one person is morally right, were utilitarianism
(consistent with Greene’s account) and amorality (consistent
with Kahane’s account).
5.1 Implications
To the best of our knowledge, this set of studies is the first to
go beyond the utilitarianism-deontology dichotomy in sacri-
ficial moral dilemmas and to include other moral views such
as virtue ethics and fatalism (agreeing with the general ap-
proach of Uhlmann et al., 2015). In addition, the scarcity of
studies on non-western populations in this field of research
makes it difficult to generalize the findings (see Ahlenius
& Tännsjö, 2012, for a comparative analysis done in the
USA, Russia and China; see also Arutyunova, Alexandrov
& Hauser, 2016, and Moore et al., 2011 for investigations
in non-Western populations). In this respect, another contri-
bution of the present study is to extend previous findings in
moral psychology to a non-western, predominantly Muslim
sample using continuous measures for moral judgments.
The findings on the principles used in moral justification,
however, should be seen as preliminary since each principle
for each scenario was based on a single item. One natu-
ral avenue for future research is to develop a reliable and
valid instrument to assess the use of each moral principle
used in this study (virtue ethics, fatalism, non-morality, util-
itarianism, and deontology), and perhaps other principles,
and relate them to the so-called utilitarian and deontological
choices in the sacrificial dilemmas. An item without the word
“moral” for the justifications might also be more informa-
tive (since the term may be interpreted narrowly, compared
to its use in, e.g., philosophy). For instance, some people
might simply choose the following option without any moral
considerations: “If you have a choice between one death and
five, you should choose the one.” Our real-life utilitarianism
questions are comprised of only two items, which may not
be consistent with some forms of utilitarianism, and which
therefore lack a complete conception of real-life utilitarian-
ism.
Another limitation of the present set of studies is that
they are all correlational (see Gawronski & Beer, 2016).
One way to experimentally check the validity of the present
findings would be to prime real-life utilitarian concerns and
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then to see whether the rate of “permissible” and “required”
responses in sacrificial dilemmas increases. It should be
possible to persuasively summarize the main points of real-
life utilitarianism in the form of a short text as a means of
manipulation (see Yilmaz & Bahçekapili, 2015, for the use
of such texts to prime meta-ethical views).
Although the effect of cognitive styles on moral judgment
has been investigated (i.e., Paxton et al., 2014), another theo-
retically interesting question would be whether various nor-
mative ethical views have differential effects on cognitive
style. Priming real-life utilitarianism and moral minimalism
through texts and seeing whether they change analytic think-
ing tendencies might be one way to experimentally test the
correlational findings in all three studies.
5.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, the preliminary findings in the present set of
studies suggest that there are moral principles apart from
utilitarianism and deontology that guide individuals’ moral
judgments. We suggest that moral psychology move beyond
the utilitarianism-deontology dichotomy and try to delineate
these other principles. It should perhaps also move beyond
the sacrificial dilemmas to elicit moral judgments since, as
Kahane argues, the options in these dilemmas (e.g., the util-
itarian option) do not necessarily reflect the moral principles
they are supposed to measure (e.g., utilitarianism as an im-
partial concern for the greater good; see also Gawronski &
Beer, 2016, for a recent review paper about the issue of the
real meanings of the judgments on moral dilemmas). One al-
ternative is to use “rule dilemmas” where participants decide
whether to violate a deontological rule to achieve a supe-
rior outcome (e.g., whether to use an unapproved treatment
method to treat a patient who is sure to die if untreated; see
Baron, Gürçay & Luce, 2017). Another alternative is to use
realistic moral dilemma situations and compare the results
with hypothetical dilemmas since it is known that individ-
uals’ aversion to harming others differ in the two types of
situation (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; see also Baron, Gürçay
& Luce, 2017; Camerer & Mobbs, 2017; Francis, et al.,
2016; Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro & Silani, 2014;
Sabo & Giner-Sorolla, 2017, for the importance of using
more realistic situations to test moral views).
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Appendix: Scenarios
Surgery: Personal. You are a doctor. You have five pa-
tients, each of whom is about to die due to a failing organ
of some kind. A new person is rushed into the hospital after
a serious car accident. This person is critically injured, and
will die without immediate surgery. It is likely you can save
this accident victim, though it would involve long and com-
plicated surgery. You realize that if you purposely cut his
carotid artery during surgery it would cause his death and no
one would ever know. Then you could harvest his organs for
transplant into the bodies of the other five patients. If you do
this, the other five patients will live, but the accident victim
will die. Is it appropriate for you to kill the accident victim
in order to save your five patients?
Sugery: Impersonal-Instrumental. You are a doctor.
You have five patients, each of whom is about to die due
to a failing organ of some kind. A new person is rushed into
the hospital after a serious car accident. This person is criti-
cally injured, and will die without immediate surgery. While
involved in long and complicated surgery on the accident
victim, you notice that a nurse is about to give him an inap-
propriate medication. You know that this error will be lethal
and by ignoring this mistake and allowing it to happen, the
patient will die. This would allow you to harvest his organs
for transplant into the bodies of the other five patients. If
you do this, the other five patients will live. Is it appropriate
for you to ignore the lethal mistake in order to save your five
patients?
Modified footbridge/trolley: Personal. A runaway trol-
ley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will
be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are
standing next to the track on which the trolley is traveling,
but you are too far away from the workmen to warn them
of the impending danger. Next to you there is a very large
stranger who is minding his own business. It occurs to you
that if you pushed this person onto the tracks in front of the
trolley, it would stop the trolley and save the five workmen
from certain death. However, this would most certainly kill
the stranger. Is it appropriate for you to push this stranger
onto the tracks to save the five workmen?
Modified footbridge/trolley: Impersonal-incidental. A
runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five work-
men who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present
course. You are standing next to the track on which the trol-
ley is traveling, but you are too far away from the workmen
to warn them of the impending danger. Next to you there
is a control switch for the tracks that can reroute the trolley.
You could divert the trolley onto another track and spare the
five workmen from certain death. However, there is another
workman on the new track that will certainly die if you divert
the trolley. Is it appropriate for you to divert the trolley and
kill the lone workman in order to save the five workmen?
